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I. INTRODUCTION

A

s Al Qaeda has dispersed, the precise definition of an “organized
armed group” (OAG) under the law of armed conflict (LOAC) has become increasingly vital. The United States currently targets certain members of Al Qaeda and affiliated organizations not only in Afghanistan, but
also in other countries.1 However, while the elements of Al Qaeda that
were present in Afghanistan immediately after September 11 presumably
constituted an OAG, it is less clear that supposed affiliates outside Afghan* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University. I thank Laurie Blank, Geoff Corn and
Rebecca Ingber for comments on a previous draft.
1. See John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Remarks at the Harvard Law School Program on Law and Security: Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws (Sept. 16, 2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-st
rengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society
of International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010),
available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm; cf. Robert M.
Chesney, Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond Al Qaeda: The Destabilizing Legal Architecture of Counterterrorism, __ MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2138623, at 14–16 (discussing dilemmas in cross-border targeting decisions).
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istan are part of the same OAG. The issue raises the stakes of targeting decisions. If affiliated groups are part of an OAG under the Al Qaeda “umbrella,” then arguably the United States has the right to target them wherever they are.2 But if groups outside Afghanistan are not part of Al Qaeda,
then targeting them requires a separate armed conflict and a separate jus ad
bellum justification for the use of force.3 Formulating and applying the
OAG criteria is therefore an essential enterprise.
This article responds to the high-stakes challenge with a pragmatic approach4 along two axes. First, it argues for a broad interpretation of the
definition of “organized armed group” framed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Prosecutor v. Tadic.5 In
practice, while the language of the definition appears to be narrow, case law
and scholarship have often expanded the concept. Second, the article
shows that terrorist groups generally, and Al Qaeda in particular, reveal a
surprising degree of organization. Some of this organization takes unconventional forms, dictated by the special circumstances of terrorist networks. Yet terrorist groups actually have many of the same organizational
needs as States, including the pervasive need to control agency costs.
Moreover, Al Qaeda exists in a synergistic relationship with many regional
groups, providing training and influencing their choice of targets. Strategic
influence of this type is a sufficient justification for targeting affiliates.
This article proceeds in two parts. Part I outlines the lessons of case
law and commentary regarding the definition of OAG. This part suggests
2. If the State in which the group is currently located is willing and able to deal with
the threat, the United States should defer to that State’s efforts. See Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VIRGINIA
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 483, 499–503 (2012) (exploring “unwilling or unable”
test based on law of neutrality); cf. Karl S. Chang, Enemy Status and Military Detention in the
War Against Al-Qaeda, 47 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 1, 25–36 (2011) (consulting neutrality law to define “enemy” who can be targeted or detained); Rebecca Ingber,
Untangling Belligerency from Neutrality in the Conflict with Al Qaeda, 47 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL
LAW JOURNAL 75 (2011) (cautioning that neutrality law does not provide useful guide for
detention of non-State actors in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs)).
3. See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 204–11 (4th ed.
2005).
4. See generally MICHAEL J. GLENNON, THE FOG OF LAW: PRAGMATISM, SECURITY,
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (2010) (recommending “broader and more flexible interpretive method”).
5. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct.
2, 1995).
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that the language used may seem narrow, but has often been interpreted in
a more flexible fashion. Part II discusses the status as OAGs of terrorist
groups in general and Al Qaeda in particular. It concludes that such groups
often possess the degree of organization required for recognition under the
laws of armed conflict. Furthermore, Al Qaeda as a network often exercises strategic influence on its affiliates that justifies targeting.
II. ORGANIZING THE CASE LAW ON OAGS
Both case law and evolving trends on the ground have precipitated the
problem of trans-regional conflicts and organized armed groups. State conflicts with organized non-State actors are considered conflicts not of an
international character (NIACs).6 At least at first blush, one would assume
that a NIAC can take place only on the territory of a single State; if the territory of more than one State is involved, it seems incongruous to deny the
“international character” of the conflict.7 Moreover, treaties and case law
have required that at least one party to an armed conflict be an OAG. Additional Protocol II (AP II) defines OAG in a narrow way. According to
AP II, OAGs must be “under responsible command, [and] exercise such
control over a part of [a State’s] territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.” 8
6. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 628–32 (2006).
7. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 10 (2011),
available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-movement/31stinternational-conference/31-int-conference-LOAC-challenges-report-11-5-1-2-en.pdf [he
reinafter IHL CHALLENGES] (discussing “multinational NIACs [in which] . . . multinational armed forces are fighting alongside the armed forces of a ‘host’ state—in its territory—
against one or more organized armed groups” as well as “transnational” conflict between
“Al Qaeda and its ‘affiliates’ and ‘adherents’ and the United States”); see generally Kenneth
Watkin, “Small Wars”: The Legal Challenges, in NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 3 (Kenneth Watkin & Andrew J. Norris eds., 2012) (Vol.
88, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies) (discussing dilemmas in conflicts
against non-State actors); cf. Geoffrey Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Transnational Armed Conflict: A “Principled” Approach to the Regulation of Counter-Terror Combat Operations, 42 ISRAEL
LAW REVIEW 1, 10–12 (2009) (arguing that NIAC concept does not fit well in analyzing
conflicts involving global terrorist network such as Al Qaeda and suggesting “transnational armed conflict” as a superior alternative).
8. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, art. 1(1), June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
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Some groups, like Hamas in Gaza or the now-defunct Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka, might meet this definition, but a network such as Al Qaeda will not. Al Qaeda’s dispersion therefore makes
precise definition a priority.
A. The High Stakes of LOAC Definitions
Much hinges on the breadth of the definition of a NIAC. A narrow definition subjects State forces to the more rigorous demands of international
human rights law (IHRL), which permits the use of deadly force only when
an individual poses a concrete, imminent threat to the life of a law enforcement officer or other individuals.9 The European Court of Human
Rights has defined such threats narrowly, second-guessing the use of lethal
force by law enforcement even when the target was a pair of known terrorists whom authorities rightly believed had planted an explosive device to be
triggered in the near future.10 Under IHRL, terrorists have a greater opportunity to operate with impunity. Applying LOAC, in contrast, diminishes
the non-State actor’s room to maneuver. It allows States to target individuals whom it believes to be performing a continuous combat function
(CCF).11 Even narrow definitions of CCF recognize that an individual who
9. See McCann v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18984/91, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97 (1995);
Geoffrey S. Corn, Extraterritorial Law Enforcement or Transnational Counterterrorist Operations:
The Stakes of Two Models, in NEW BATTLEFIELDS, OLD LAWS: CRITICAL DEBATES ON
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 23, 35 (William C. Banks ed., 2011) (analyzing the relationship
between LOAC and law enforcement paradigms); John B. Bellinger III & Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Detention Operations in Contemporary Conflicts: Four Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing Law, 105 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 201, 210–
13 (2011) (same); see also Evan J. Criddle, Proportionality in Counterinsurgency: A Relational Theory, 87 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 1073 (2012) (arguing that IHRL paradigm fits most
cases involving violence by a State’s nationals within a State’s own territory); David Luban,
Military Lawyering and the Two Cultures Problem, 25 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW __ (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2054832 (asserting that
law of armed conflict shows insufficient regard for welfare of civilians and that human
rights law is superior in this respect); cf. Monica Hakimi, A Functional Approach to Targeting
and Detention, 110 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 1365 (2012) (arguing for functional criteria that
transcend distinction between LOAC and IHRL).
10. See McCann, App. No. 18984/91 ¶¶ 7–22 (Ryssdal, J., dissenting); cf. Peter Margulies, Valor’s Vices: Against a State Duty to Risk Forces in Armed Conflict, in SHAPING A GLOBAL
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN ASYMMETRIC
WARFARE 87, 99 (William C. Banks ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 2013) (critiquing McCann).
11. See HCJ 769/02 The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The Government of Israel, ¶ 39 [2006] (Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007
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performs this role may spend much time in pursuits other than presenting
a concrete, imminent threat to the other side. A typical uniformed soldier,
for example, may spend time marching, building an encampment or even
sleeping. The soldier can be targeted by an enemy State’s forces in any and
all of these activities.12 Just as a State can target an opposing State’s uniformed forces without a showing that an individual soldier faces a specific,
imminent threat, LOAC would allow targeting of a member of an armed
group whom the State reasonably believed to be engaged in a CCF.
However, the greater latitude allowed States in targeting terrorists
makes human rights advocates blanch at the prospect of higher civilian
casualties.13 More latitude in targeting may increase the risk of mistakes, in
/A34/02007690.a34.pdf%20 (asserting that fighters who makes themselves regularly
available to terrorist groups for acts of violence are directly participating in hostilities for
such time as they make themselves available; any interlude between acts of violence is
merely “preparation” for further violence). In this analysis, the PCAT Court lent a flexible
reading to concepts that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has defined more narrowly. See NILS MELZER, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED
CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 54 (2009), available at
http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/20/Legal%20Conference/ICRC_002_0990.pdf (arguing that terrorist bomb maker would be immune from targeting when not making bombs);
see also Gabor Rona, US Targeted Killing Policy Unjustified, JURIST (Feb. 24, 2012),
http://jurist.org/hotline /2012/02/gabor-rona-targeted-killing.php (criticizing United
States’ targeting standards as unduly broad); but see Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct
Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements, 42 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLITICS 697, 731 (2010) (criticizing narrow reading in ICRC
Guidance); Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct
Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLITICS 641, 661 (2010) (criticizing ICRC’s failure to dismantle
“revolving door” mechanism for terrorist groups).
12. See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 143 (1977); but see Gabriella Blum, The Dispensable Lives of
Soldiers, 2 JOURNAL OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 115, 138–50 (2010) (questioning whether use of
lethal force should always be permissible against uniformed combatants).
13. See Jens David Ohlin, The Duty to Capture, 97 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2131720. Although the definition of an
OAG is relevant to targeting decisions, the targeting debate also raises other issues beyond
the scope of this article. Compare Kenneth Anderson, Efficiency In Bello and Ad Bellum:
Making the Use of Force Too Easy?, in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW AND MORALITY IN AN
ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 374, 391–96 (Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin & Andrew
Altman eds., 2012) (rejecting argument that sophisticated technology behind drones that
makes targeted killing easier also undermines practical checks on willingness to wage war);
Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Killed? Anwar Al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the International
Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, 13 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 3
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which a State erroneously targets innocents or causes collateral damage
among civilians.14 Advocates of greater State latitude will argue that States
can and should build in systems that minimize mistakes, such as a lawyer’s
review and approval of targeting decisions. However, State advocates
would add, opponents of State latitude have a bad case of hindsight bias15
regarding State action. State critics regard all civilian casualties as avoidable,
a position that the law of war has never taken. However, proponents of
State latitude would argue, critics fail to consider matters from an ex ante
perspective, involving the incentives for violent non-State actors. When
violent non-State actors believe they can operate with impunity, risks to
civilians increase.16 Curbing violent non-State actors thus reduces net risks
for civilians.

(2011) (suggesting that targeted killing under certain conditions is consistent with LOAC);
Peter Margulies, The Fog of War Reform: Change and Structure in the Law of Armed Conflict After
September 11, 95 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW 1417, 1471–77 (2012) (same); Jordan J. Paust,
Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19
JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW & POLICY 237 (2010) (asserting that targeted killing is
legal under international law as long as targeting force observes principles of distinction
and proportionality), with PHILIP ALSTON, HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON EXTRAJUDICIAL, SUMMARY OR ARBITRARY EXECUTIONS (2010)
(arguing that targeted killing in State that is not geographic site of armed conflict violates
international law); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study
of Pakistan, 2004–2009, in SHOOTING TO KILL: THE LAW GOVERNING LETHAL FORCE IN
CONTEXT (Simon Bronitt ed., 2011); cf. Jennifer C. Daskal, The Geography of the Battlefield: A
Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside the “Hot” Conflict Zone, 161 UNIVERSITY OF
PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW __ (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=2049532 (suggesting additional guidelines to regulate targeted killings).
14. But see JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11, at 131 (2012) (noting involvement of military lawyers in targeting
decisions as check on errors); Gregory McNeal, Are Targeted Killings Unlawful: A Case Study
in Empirical Claims Without Empirical Evidence, in TARGETED KILLINGS, supra note 13, at
326, 331–42 (discussing process engaged in by U.S. military prior to authorization of
drone strike).
15. See Neal J. Roese, Twisted Pair: Counterfactual Thinking and the Hindsight Bias, in
BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 258, 260–61 (Derek J.
Koehler & Nigel Harvey eds., 2004) (describing hindsight bias as “tendency to believe that
an event was predictable before it occurred, even though for the perceiver it was not” and
that harm was avoidable even when it was impossible to prevent).
16. See Margulies, supra note 10; Michael W. Lewis, Drones and the Boundaries of the Battlefield, 47 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 293 (2012) (suggesting that narrow geographic restrictions on States’ ability to target terrorist groups with global operations
would grant these groups asymmetric advantage).
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Moreover, State critics often do not acknowledge that while a broader
definition of OAG confers advantages on a State in the arena of targeting,
with that advantage comes greater accountability for all parties to the NIAC.17 A State in a NIAC must observe the strictures of the Geneva Conventions’ Common Article 3, such as humane treatment of captives.18
These provisions are generally considered jus cogens and therefore non–
derogable.19 OAGs incur the same duties; one purpose of the requirement
that a group have a minimum level of organization is that it would be unfair to require a disorganized group to observe LOAC without possessing
the structure to do so. Individuals who target civilians can be made to answer for violations of municipal law, such as the prohibition on murder. In
contrast, OAGs who target civilians may be prosecuted in international
tribunals for crimes against humanity, instead of merely being answerable
in the sometimes dysfunctional justice systems of their countries of origin.
The targeting advantages reaped by States are thus paid for by greater accountability elsewhere in the LOAC framework.20
B. Unpacking the ICTY Formulation
At first blush, State critics may have an edge in the definitional debate regarding OAG. Some passages in case law have propounded a narrow definition of OAG that requires something approaching the attributes of
States.21 In Prosecutor v. Limaj, the ICTY suggested that to meet its criteria,
an OAG should have a headquarters, a unified command and a military

17. See Ohlin, supra note 13, at 21–22.
18. See Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art.
3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
19. IHRL provisions are often subject to derogation. Cf. IHL CHALLENGES, supra
note 7, at 15 (describing applicability and scope of IHRL, particularly extraterritorial applicability, as “work in progress”).
20. See United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. DOC. A/HRC/21/50, ¶
134 (Aug. 16, 2012), available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/AHRC-21-50_en.pdf (noting accountability under LOAC of anti-government armed groups
in Syria) [hereinafter U.N.H.C.R., Independent International Commission Report].
21. See Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 113–
117 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005) [hereinafter Limaj]; cf.
Jelena Pejic, The Protective Scope of Common Article 3: More than Meets the Eye, 93(881) INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 189, 191–92 (2011) (noting factors).
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police unit that will arrest malefactors.22 Without these attributes, a group is
considered to be a criminal band or an assemblage of individuals engaged
in civil unrest such as a riot, rather than an OAG.23 Individuals in such
groups cannot be targeted as readily as participants in an armed conflict,
but instead are protected by IHRL.
Acts of terrorism sit uneasily within this paradigm. “[I]solated acts of
terrorism” probably do not demonstrate the level of organization required
for a NIAC.24 Moreover, some commentators have noted that several major nations have addressed significant acts of terrorism through traditional
law enforcement means.25
If a terrorist entity can elude definition as an OAG within one State, it
can even more readily elude such definition in the regional or global context. The United States confronts extremist organizations with varying degrees of closeness to Al Qaeda in multiple regions. Some have argued that
Al Qaeda’s relationship to such groups involves only “very loose ties” typical of a “confederation of like-minded fellow travelers, many of whom are
fighting separate armed conflicts in different regions of the globe.”26
22. Limaj, supra note 21, ¶ 113–17; see also Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-964-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 626 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998) (“responsible command” entails “degree of organization [that permits the group] . . . to plan
and carry out concerted military operations, and to impose discipline”; group must also
“dominate a sufficient part of territory” and “operations must be continuous and
planned”).
23. In some cases, a criminal enterprise may be so organized and its violence against
State officials so intense that classification as a NIAC is appropriate. See Carina Bergal,
Note, The Mexican Drug War: The Case for a Non-International Armed Conflict Classification, 34
FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 1042 (2011).
24. See Prosecutor v. Boskoski & Tarculovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment, ¶ 190 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008) [hereinafter
Boskoski].
25. See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, FINAL REPORT ON THE MEANING OF
ARMED CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 (2010); cf. Kim Lane Scheppele, The International Standardization of National Security Law, 4 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW &
POLICY 437, 451 (2010) (asserting that global counterterrorism measures permit States to
disguise substandard governance as counterterrorism); Sudha Setty, Comparative Perspectives
on Specialized Trials for Terrorism, 63 MAINE LAW REVIEW 131, 153 (2010) (suggesting that
counterterrorism policies in United States, United Kingdom and India raise human rights
concerns).
26. See Jens David Ohlin, Targeting Co-Belligerents, in TARGETED KILLINGS, supra note
13, at 60, 75 (emphasis added) (noting this view while not necessarily endorsing it); Craig
Martin, Going Medieval: Targeted Killing, Self-Defense and the Jus ad Bellum Regime, in TARGETED KILLINGS, supra note 13, at 223, 245–46 (suggesting that groups with nominal Al
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Treaty law and the ICTY jurisprudence actually permit greater flexibility in the definition of OAGs. While AP II applies to some NIACs, other
NIACs are governed by Common Article 3, which contains no requirement that a party control territory.27 The International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC), a group with special competence regarding LOAC, has
also signaled that flexibility is important. In one study, the ICRC observed
that to be considered an OAG, an entity should merely have a “minimum
of organization.”28 That terminology strongly suggests that a rigid, itemized
checklist would be counterproductive.29
Moreover, the ICTY jurisprudence is far more flexible than it may appear.30 In Prosecutor v. Boskoski & Tarculovski,31 a case involving the targeting
of civilians by a non-State group, the ICTY noted that terrorist acts could
form a pattern that would constitute an armed conflict.32 Boskoski can be
read as standing for either one or two eminently pragmatic propositions.
Qaeda ties actually have little in common); see also Robin Geiß, Armed Violence in Fragile
States: Low-Intensity Conflicts, Spillover Conflicts, and Sporadic Law Enforcement Operations by Third
Parties, 91(873) INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 127, 134–35 (March 2009)
(global Al Qaeda network structure appears “rather basic” and “rudimentarily organized”);
cf. Ohlin, supra note 13 (offering more pragmatic view).
27. Ohlin, supra note 13, at 11–12; Michael N. Schmitt, Unmanned Combat Aircraft Systems and International Humanitarian Law: Simplifying the Oft Benighted Debate, 30 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 595, 604–06 (2012) (discussing relationship between AP II and Common Article 3); cf. Andreas Paulus & Mindia Vashakmadze, Asymmetrical War and the Notion of Armed Conflict – A Tentative Conceptualization, 91(873) INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 95, 117 (Mar. 2009) (discussing importance of
flexibility in definition of an OAG).
28. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, HOW IS THE TERM
“ARMED CONFLICT” DEFINED IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW? 5 (2008),
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf.
29. However, the ICRC has also indicated that the criteria mentioned in the ICTY jurisprudence are useful guides. See IHL CHALLENGES, supra note 7, at 8 (requiring a “certain level of organization,” which may include, but is not limited to, “the existence of a
command structure . . . disciplinary rules . . . headquarters,” and logistical, attack, and negotiating capabilities).
30. See Ohlin, supra note 13, at 14 (“legal support for [requiring] centralization is misplaced”); Michael N. Schmitt, The Status of Opposition Fighters in a Non-International Armed
Conflict, in Non-International Armed Conflict in the Twenty-First Century 119, 129 (Kenneth Watkin & Andrew Norris eds., 2012) (Vol. 88, U.S. Naval War College International
Law Studies) (arguing that group’s structure “need not be strictly hierarchical or implemented in any formalistic manner”).
31. Boskoski, supra note 24.
32. Id. ¶ 185 (noting that terrorism may be part of NIAC if it is part of “protracted
campaign”).
62

Networks in Non-International Armed Conflicts

Vol. 89

First, OAGs should not be assessed in a vacuum, but on a sliding scale that
also includes the other Tadic criterion, intensity.33 Second, the best proof of
an OAG is in the operational details of the violence that members of the
group have caused. A group’s sheer ability to mount sustained terrorist attacks is evidence of a “high level of planning and a coordinated command
structure.”34
The ICTY’s finding that evidence of discipline exists also suggests substantial flexibility in the definition of an OAG. In Limaj, for example, the
ICTY found that the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was organized even
though evidence of discipline was “scant” by the court’s own admission. 35
Witnesses differed widely on when the military police cited by the tribunal
had been established.36 If the military police were a salient symbol of organizational discipline, this divergence in recollection seems odd. Moreover, as
the ICTY acknowledged, there was no record of any imposition of discipline among KLA members.37
The Limaj court sought to buttress this decidedly equivocal evidence of
discipline with a proxy: other nations and entities dealt with the KLA in a
way that suggested that they regarded the group as organized,38 although
evidence for this point was slim. For example, the ICTY acknowledged
that representatives of States and other entities were “sometimes unclear
about the KLA’s command structure.”39 Indeed, one report described the
KLA’s structure as “a mystery” and “more a matter of diffuse horizontal
command.”40 Limaj also noted that the General Staff of the KLA “did not
have a consistent . . . location.”41 The Tribunal acknowledged that the authorship and date of the KLA’s governing regulations were not apparent
33. Id. ¶¶ 182–83; see also Laurie R. Blank & Geoffrey S. Corn, Losing the Forest for the
Trees: Syria, Law, and the Pragmatics of Conflict Recognition, 46 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF
TRANSNATIONAL LAW __ (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2029989, at 22–23 (discussing flexibility in ICTY approach); U.N.H.C.R., Independent International Commission Report, supra note 20, ¶ 134 (asserting that anti-government armed
groups in Syria should be considered OAGs that are accountable under LOAC).
34. Boskoski, supra note 24, ¶ 204.
35. Limaj, supra note 21, ¶ 116.
36. Id. ¶ 113.
37. Id. ¶ 116.
38. See Limaj, supra note 21, ¶¶ 128–29.
39. Id. ¶ 131 (citing Austrian Embassy report).
40. Id. ¶ 131 (also observing that American diplomat Richard Holbrooke seconded
this perception).
41. Id. ¶ 104.
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on the regulations’ face.42 Yet the ICTY brushed past these apparent failures of organization, explaining pragmatically that the KLA was “effectively an underground operation, operating in conditions of secrecy out of
concern to preserve its leadership” and “under constant threat of military
action” by Serbian forces.43 Therefore, it was “no surprise that the organizational structure and the hierarchy of the KLA was confusing.”44 More
than any other factor, the court relied on the KLA’s knack for recruiting
new followers.45 On the basis of this one criterion and modest evidence of
others, the court was satisfied that the KLA’s fluid and contingent structure did not undermine its classification as an OAG.
Precedent from elsewhere also argues against a narrow definition of organization. Consider Abella v. Argentina (Tablada Case),46 involving an attack
on an Argentinean army base by rebels, followed by alleged State mistreatment of the attackers that the plaintiffs characterized as a violation of
Common Article 3. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) first ruled that AP II did not limit the situations in which armed
conflict existed. The tribunal observed that armed conflicts “not of an international character” that trigger Common Article 3 need not be “largescale and generalized hostilities or a situation comparable to a civil war in
which dissident armed groups exercise control over parts of national territory.”47 Suggesting the need for flexibility, the IACHR noted that NIACs
could also involve “confrontations between relatively organized armed forces.”48 The tribunal’s use of the term “relatively” to modify the requirement
of an OAG suggests that a narrow or rigid definition would be counterproductive. While the tribunal added that an armed conflict must be something more than “riots, mere acts of banditry or an unorganized and shortlived rebellion,”49 its analysis indicated that requiring a significantly more
elaborate showing would merely allow parties to escape accountability.
42. Id. ¶ 110; see also id. ¶ 124 (discussing KLA’s lack of communications equipment).
43. Id. ¶ 132; cf. Daniel Byman & Matthew C. Waxman, Kosovo and the Great Air Power
Debate, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Spring 2000, at 25 (finding that KLA failed to show
“that it was capable of holding territory against the Serbian Army”); id. at 28 (describing
KLA as initially “poorly organized” and as gaining strength only with NATO assistance).
44. Limaj, supra note 21, ¶ 132.
45. Id. ¶ 118.
46. Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, Report No. 55/97, ¶ 152 (Nov. 18, 1997) [hereinafter Tablada Case].
47. Id. ¶ 152.
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. Id.
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Turning to the specific facts, the IACHR found it sufficient that the rebels’
attack on the base was “carefully planned, coordinated and executed.”50
Tribunals have also expansively defined a non-State actor’s capacity to
comply with LOAC. Terrorist groups generally do not comply with LOAC;
often their standard operating procedure involves fundamental violations
such as the targeting of civilians. But tribunals have viewed terrorist groups
as able to comply with LOAC, even if those groups are disinclined to do
so.51 A contrary view would create perverse incentives, allowing a group to
free itself from the risk of targeting by increasing its violations of otherwise
applicable norms.52
Buttressing this flexible approach, the ICTY has also broadly interpreted the Tadic requirement that violence be “protracted.” Interpreting the
term “protracted” narrowly would again create perverse incentives. Violent
non-State actors could strike first and then claim that the conflict was not
yet a protracted one, thereby precluding a State from utilizing the full range
of responses permissible under LOAC. Instead, the State would be limited
to the far narrower repertoire of force permissible under a law enforcement
paradigm. To avoid creating this perverse incentive, the ICTY has viewed
the term “protracted armed violence” in a pragmatic fashion, as referring
generally to the intensity of the violence, not its timing per se.53
III. MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE: THE ORGANIZATION
OF TERRORIST NETWORKS
Just as a deeper look at case law suggests that the definition of OAG is
more flexible than it initially appears, terrorist groups are more organized
50. Id. ¶ 155. While the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda set out a narrower standard in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, that standard has generally not been followed and “is
regarded as exceedingly high.” See Geiß, supra note 26, at 136 n.40.
51. See Boskoski, supra note 24, ¶¶ 204–5 (pattern of LOAC violations does not support inference that group is unable to comply).
52. Cf. id. at 205 (explaining that tribunal “cannot merely infer a lack of organization .
. . [because] international humanitarian law was frequently violated by [the group’s] members”).
53. See Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 49
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008) (noting the term “protracted
armed violence” has been “interpreted in practice… as referring more to the intensity of
the armed violence than to its duration”); see also Tablada Case, supra not 46, ¶ 156 (noting
that “brief duration” of attack did not preclude classification as NIAC); cf. Paulus &
Vashakmadze, supra note 27, at 106–07 (arguing that Tadic “protracted armed violence”
criterion refers to intensity as well as duration).
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than their historical image suggests. Although some scholars have viewed
earlier acts of terror as the product of individual discontent, they actually
involved careful planning.54 Today’s terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda,
also display far more organization than is commonly understood.
A. Terrorist Groups, Organization and Agency Costs
Terrorist groups require organization because they wish to influence actors
who are often organized. Terrorist groups play a multi-level game of the
kind made famous by Robert Putnam, involving internal and external actors.55 Internal actors include people within the organization and within the
community that the group purports to represent—Al Qaeda claims to
stand for a particular religious vision, while a group like Hamas purports to
represent Palestinians and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) Kurds. External actors include States where the terrorist group is principally located,
other States where the group wishes to extend its influence, groups of
States such as Western nations or States in the Middle East, international
organizations, and other terrorist groups.56
Terrorist groups use violence for both expressive and instrumental
ends. Violence expresses their commitment to a distinctive vision that the
mundane corruption of other parties obscures.57 Certain kinds of violence,
such as suicide attacks, communicate this commitment in an even clearer
form—sending a message about the group’s dedication to its cause.58 Instrumentally, violence serves as a spoiler, derailing negotiations between
States and moderate members of the group’s own community.59 On occasion, terrorist groups find it expedient to mitigate violence, to avoid alienat-

54. See Bruce Hoffman, The Myth of Grass Roots Terrorism (Book Review), 87(3) FOR133, 135–36 (2008) (discussing careful organization behind assassination of
Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand, which precipitated World War I).
55. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,
42 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 427 (1988).
56. See Max Abrahms, What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism
Strategy, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Spring 2008, at 85–86; Erica Chenoweth et al., What
Makes Terrorists Tick?, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Spring 2009, at 83.
57. See BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 168–69 (1998).
58. See Abrahms, supra note 56, at 85–86.
59. Cf. Andrew H. Kydd & Barbara F. Walter, The Strategies of Terrorism, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2006, at 72–75 (explaining incentives for violent extremists to
undermine peace negotiations).
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ing key constituencies or to gain time to regroup from State pressure. 60
Managing violence to maximize both expressive and instrumental goals
requires organization. Maintaining fidelity to these goals in the face of State
pressure and internal disagreement requires a particular agility in organizational form.
Like any other entity, a terrorist group needs some form of discipline.
Without discipline, agency costs proliferate, as undisciplined members pursue their own impulses or agendas to the detriment of the organization’s
goals.61 However, discipline requires institutional memory, as leaders monitor, document and assess the performance of subordinates. Documentation
can be exploited by the group’s foes, providing information about operatives and planned attacks. Terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda, grapple
with the conflict between uniform messaging and secrecy.
Al Qaeda has coped with this dilemma by cultivating a portfolio approach that maximizes versatility in structure and decision making, as well
as in operational plans.62 Wise investors use portfolio theory to diversify
risk. The careful and prudent investor never entrusts all of her resources to
one company or even one sector. Rather, the investor pursues some measure of risk diversification. If one investment fails to bring returns, others
can pick up the slack.63
Al Qaeda employs a portfolio approach to operations. Officials have
recognized that Al Qaeda needs to be right only once to achieve its expressive and instrumental goals, while security officials must be right every
time.64 Running several plots simultaneously keeps State adversaries guessing, lodging the initiative with Al Qaeda. Even if the vast majority of attacks are prevented, one catastrophic attack sends the message that Al
60. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2729–30 (2010); cf. Peter
Margulies, Advising Terrorism: Material Support, Safe Harbors, and Freedom of Speech, 63 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL 455, 486–93 (2012) (discussing manipulation of public opinion by
terrorist groups).
61. Cf. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation
and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 509 (1994) (discussing
virtues and risks of working through agents).
62. Cf. Matthew C. Waxman, The Structure of Terrorism Threats and the Laws of War, 20
DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW 429, 433–37 (2010) (distinguishing between “top-down” and “bottom-up” threats).
63. See Lee-Ford Tritt, The Limitations of an Economic Agency Cost Theory of Trust Law, 32
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 2579, 2622 (2011).
64. See Frances Fragos Townsend, The President’s Plan, in 10 Ways to Avoid the Next
9/11, NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 10, 2006, § 4, 13.
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Qaeda is still on the map. That message encourages further attacks and distorts government policies. Al Qaeda uses a similar approach to organizational form. It varies its structure as the need requires, equipping its personnel to leverage “evolving relationships” rather than being wed to a particular organizational structure.65 Sticking with one organizational form
would also give an advantage to Al Qaeda’s adversaries.66 Al Qaeda has
adopted an approach to structure that minimizes this risk, mixing command decisions with subordinates’ operational initiative. While some have
argued that most terrorist acts are the product of independent, grassroots
efforts,67 that picture is decidedly incomplete. According to terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman, Al Qaeda is a “remarkably agile and flexible organization that exercises both top-down and bottom-up planning and operational
capabilities.”68
Accounts of terrorist groups as creatures of chaos are inaccurate. It
turns out that terrorist groups breed bureaucracy. Like lawful organizations,
terrorist groups wrestle with the ubiquitous problem of agency costs. Al
Qaeda, like a State military unit, uses personnel drawn from a variety of
backgrounds whom it expects to fulfill the group’s mission.69 However,
operatives may have agendas of their own. For example, they may have an
interest in looting civilian property or skimming money from the group and
enriching themselves.70 Alternatively, terrorist operatives may engage in
more violence than the group’s leaders find optimal, because the operatives
65. See Reid Sawyer & Michael Foster, The Resurgent and Persistent Threat of al Qaeda, 618
ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL & SOCIAL SCIENCE 197, 200 (2008).
66. See Abdulkader H. Sinno, Armed Groups’ Organizational Structure and Their Strategic
Options, 93(882) INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 311, 318 (2011) (noting
that networks such as Al Qaeda are less vulnerable to State retaliation because of the mobile and dispersed nature of their leadership).
67. See MARC SAGEMAN, LEADERLESS JIHAD: TERROR NETWORKS IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY 23–24 (2008).
68. Hoffman, supra note 54, at 134.
69. Jacob N. Shapiro & David A. Siegel, Moral Hazard, Discipline, and the Management of
Terrorist Organizations, 64 WORLD POLITICS 39, 73 (2012); see also John Mueller & Mark G.
Stewart, The Terrorism Delusion: America’s Overwrought Response to September 11, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2012 (arguing that individual defendants convicted in the
United States of terrorism-related crimes were often lacking in competence and judgment);
cf. Brahma Chellaney, Fighting Terrorism in Southern Asia: The Lessons of History, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Winter 2001–02, at 96–97 (noting, as an example of agency costs in
counterterrorism, that aid to South Asian governments and non-State groups to fight terrorism has been siphoned off for other purposes).
70. Shapiro & Siegel, supra note 69, at 54–55.
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have developed habits of violence while leaders sometimes believe that relative restraint enhances the organizational brand.71 Bureaucratic rules and
procedures can help the terrorist group address these problems.
Consider the case of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). AQI was a “cohesive organization with shared personnel across ‘official’ names, institutional
memory, embedded management practices, and permanent salaried employees.”72 Both AQI and its successor organization, the Islamic State of
Iraq (ISI), took steps to enforce discipline among members.73 For example,
terrorist groups such as AQI keep copious records of the success and failure of operations, even though maintaining such records greatly enhances
the risk that adversaries will obtain custody of this information and use it
against these groups.74 Groups such as AQI clearly believe that committing
rules and communications to writing tightens the organization of the
group, making defection or shirking more difficult. AQI required signed
pledges by fighters who consented to conditions on various activities.75 For
example, AQI threatened to expel members who engaged in ordinary criminal conduct, such as looting, which would distract from the group’s ideological agenda.76 ISI instituted controls that would bring a glow to the most
austere of accountants, decreeing that, “[f]or every amount paid out of [organizational] funds, the recipient is required to provide two signatures . . .
one for receiving the money and another one to show how the money was
spent.”77 Another ISI pronunciamento declared that “[a]ll properties, small
and large, will be inventoried.”78 The ISI also required operatives to upload
information on flash drives, to be “sent every week to the [group’s] administrator.”79 The proliferation of flash drives and memory sticks obviously
ratchets up the risk that some of the information contained in these devices
will end up in the hands of the group’s adversaries.80 However, ISI apparently determined that the benefits of such a structure to group discipline
outweighed those risks.
71. Cf. Mueller & Stewart, supra note 69, at 91 (asserting that Muslim population
worldwide has been alienated by Al Qaeda’s indiscriminate violence).
72. Shapiro & Siegel, supra note 69, at 48 n.32.
73. Id. at 47.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 48.
76. Id. at 49–50.
77. Id. at 50.
78. Shapiro & Siegel, supra note 69.
79. Id. at 51.
80. Id. at 50.
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ISI also kept careful track of all of its operatives, cataloging incoming
fighters, ongoing staff and “exiting brothers.”81 These internal records distinguished between the assignments of new staff, who might be suicide
bombers or perform other roles.82 This record keeping, like the ban on
looting, served strategic and ideological purposes. Operatives in Iraq were
often foreign nationals who had entered Iraq because ISI’s practice of violence resonated with their preconceived beliefs or habits.83 Left to their
own devices, these recruits might engage in violence “for its own sake.”84
However, indiscriminate violence, like looting, could impair the group’s
messaging. Record keeping also enhances the propaganda capabilities of
terrorist groups. In most groups, claiming credit for an attack is as important as the attack itself.85 Claiming credit announces to the world and to
other terrorist groups that the organization has “arrived.” Claiming credit
for violence also enhances the group’s commitment: a suicide attack, for
example, signals the sincerity of the attacker’s beliefs and those of the organization.
One can also view a strategy relying on suicide attacks as a decision
about the costs of internal monitoring. Suppose that a terrorist leader orders a conventional (non-suicide) attack. For whatever reason, the attack
fizzles. The group’s leadership then could have a difficult time in evaluating
the causes for the attack’s failure in a “noisy” environment,86 where many
factors can impede optimal execution. An attacker who survives a suboptimal attack will likely have many excuses for why the operation failed to go
as planned. The leader will need to weigh those excuses before deciding on
the staffing for the next attack. A suicide attack dispenses with the excusesifting phase, and also gives the suicide operative no exit strategy apart
from outright desertion. Since that path leads to disgrace,87 a suicide attack

81. Id. at 51.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 52.
84. Shapiro & Siegel, supra note 69.
85. See Abrahms, supra note 56.
86. See Shapiro & Siegel, supra note 69, at 73.
87. This is a particularly compelling factor when groups also provide social services
and cash benefits to operatives’ families. See Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief &
Development, 549 F.3d 685, 698 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that Hamas’s social service programs “mak[e] it more costly . . . to defect”); Eli Berman & David D. Laitin, Religion, Terrorism, and Public Goods: Testing the Club Model, 92 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1942,
1952, 1955 (2008) (same); see also Justin Magouirk, The Nefarious Helping Hand: Anti70
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is often a good way of ensuring discipline. However, making sure that the
operative has sufficient ties to the organization and a “track record” of violence and ideological commitment requires some degree of organization.
B. Terrorist Networks and Global Reach
Al Qaeda displays this mix of organizational forms in its relationships with
affiliated groups.88 While Al Qaeda’s core remains in Pakistan, its lack of
geographic proximity to other groups is not necessarily a weakness. Network theory teaches us that physical proximity is less important when
knowledge and values can be shared in other ways.89
Links between Al Qaeda and regional groups are synergistic along a
number of axes. The Taliban/Al Qaeda link has been durable and effective because it combined the embedded localism of the Afghan Taliban
with the extreme Islamist network of schools and camps based in Pakistan.90 In other situations, regional organizations seek out Al Qaeda when
State pressure has weakened the organization.91 Allied with Al Qaeda,
groups can share information on effective strategies and learn from their
mistakes.92 Al Qaeda has historically welcomed such overtures, since they
assist the global group in extending its brand.93 More sophisticated technology, including improvement in transportation and communications, has
made it far easier to coordinate activities across regions.94

Corruption Campaigns, Social Services Provisions, and Terrorism, 20(3) TERRORISM & POLITICAL
VIOLENCE 356, 358 (2008) (discussing Hamas’s provision of social services).
88. For more on the strengths and weaknesses of networks, see Mette EilstrupSangiovanni & Calvert Jones, Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why al-Qaida May Be
Less Threatening Than Many Think, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Fall 2008, at 11–33 (2008);
see also Chesney, supra note 1, at 23–29 (discussing interaction and entropy in Al Qaeda’s
relationships with groups in Yemen and Somalia).
89. Stephen R. Borgatti & Rob Cross, A Relational View of Information Seeking and Learning in Social Networks, 49 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 432, 436, 439, 441 (2003).
90. See Paul Staniland, Organizing Insurgency: Networks, Resources, and Rebellion in South
Asia, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 2012, at 171 (Summer 2012).
91. Daniel L. Byman, Breaking the Bonds Between Al-Qa’ida and Its Affiliate Organizations
14–15 (Aug. 2012), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files
/papers/2012/7/alqaida%20terrorism%20byman/alqaida%20terrorism%20byman.pdf.
92. Id. at 15.
93. Id. at 13.
94. See Jeremy Pressman, Rethinking Transnational Counterterrorism: Beyond a National
Framework, 30(4) THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY 63, 64 (Autumn 2007).
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Examples of this synergy abound. For example, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which operates primarily in Yemen, began as a result
of “direct orders” from Osama bin Laden to Al Qaeda members on the
ground in that region.95 Today, AQAP is both more “professional” in its
operations and more linked to the Al Qaeda “core.”96 In North Africa, Al
Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) enjoys a partnership with Al
Qaeda.97 Al Qaeda’s current leader, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, announced a
“blessed union” with AQIM, leading both groups to focus on attacking
French interests.98 In Somalia, the terrorist group al Shabab publicly
pledged its loyalty to Al Qaeda.99 Operatives trained in Afghanistan camps
transferred to Somalia to provide training to Shabab members.100 The two
organizations now cooperate on a host of matters, from ideological instruction to advanced tactics.101 Zarqawi’s AQI “willingly merged” with bin
Laden’s group, although the latter had been weakened by the erosion of its
base in Afghanistan after September 11.102 Credible evidence indicates that
members of Al Qaeda in Iraq have been assigned to “establish cells in other countries.”103
Al Qaeda provides training for operations elsewhere. For example, the
perpetrators of the London subway suicide attacks obtained training from
Al Qaeda branches in Pakistan.104 Indeed, Al Qaeda provided training in
95. See Leah Farrall, How Al Qaeda Works: What the Organization’s Subsidiaries Say About
Its Strength, 90 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 128, 132 (2011); cf. Byman, supra note 91, at 5–6 (discussing relationship between Al Qaeda and AQAP); Jane Novak, Arabian Peninsula al Qaeda
groups merge, LONG WAR JOURNAL, Jan. 26, 2009, http://www.longwarjournal.org
/archives/2009/01/arabian_peninsula_al.php (same).
96. See Byman, supra note 91, at 6.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 7.
101. Id.
102. Farrall, supra note 95, at 133; cf. Matthew Levitt, Untangling the Terror Web: Identifying and Counteracting the Phenomenon of Crossover Between Terrorist Groups, 24(1) SAIS Review
33, 38–39 (Winter–Spring 2004).
103. See Hoffman, supra note 54, at 135. The pattern of collaboration with Al Qaeda is
not monolithic; members of some groups have broken away. See Byman, supra note 91, at
7–8 (discussing Egypt’s Gama al-Islamiya, many of whose members renounced violence
after influence of Al Qaeda led to widely criticized 1997 attack on tourists at Luxor).
104. See Hoffman, supra note 54, at 138; Anthony N. Celso, Al Qaeda’s Post-9/11 Organizational Strategy: The Role of Islamist Regional Affiliates, 23 MEDITERRANEAN QUARTERLY
30, 35 (2012); cf. Pressman, supra note 94, at 65 (“[f]undraising, recruitment . . . and training may take place in many countries simultaneously for transnational groups”).
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Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen to as many as three thousand violent extremists from the United Kingdom, who subsequently returned, “embedd[ed] themselves” in communities and developed plans for further attacks.105 While discrimination and alienation from the mainstream in the
United Kingdom and elsewhere may have facilitated additional recruitment,
“much of the terrorist threat in the United Kingdom today stems from deliberate, long-standing subversion by al Qaeda.”106 Al Qaeda–linked networks released videotaped martyrs’ wills.107 Other plots, such as the conspiracy to target transatlantic passenger aircraft in 2006, also have ties to Al
Qaeda networks in Pakistan or Yemen.108 Groups such as Hezbollah have
global networks that attract financing and recruit new members.109 Moreover, some terrorist groups have strong links to transnational criminal enterprises that share the proceeds of drug trafficking, kidnapping and prostitution.110
Groups partnering with Al Qaeda buy into a distinctive operational focus. While many groups have local agendas, groups under the Al Qaeda
umbrella must agree to pursue attacks on Western interests. 111 The attacks
on Western interests are a signature element of Al Qaeda; perpetuating
these attacks allows groups under the Al Qaeda umbrella to “stay on mes-

105. See Hoffman, supra note 54, at 138.
106. Id.
107. Celso, supra note 104, at 35.
108. Id.
109. See Levitt, supra note 102, at 35. My point here is not that Hezbollah is affiliated
with Al Qaeda, but that Al Qaeda may emulate Hezbollah’s worldwide financial activities.
See Jonathan M. Winer, Countering Terrorist Finance: A Work, Mostly in Progress, 618 ANNALS
OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL & SOCIAL SCIENCE 112, 116 (2008) (discussing Al Qaeda’s funding connections in Saudi Arabia).
110. See Phil Williams, Terrorist Financing and Organized Crime: Nexus, Appropriation, or
Transformation?, in COUNTERING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM 126, 138–39 (Thomas J.
Biersteker & Sue E. Eckert eds., Routledge 2008) (describing involvement of LTTE in
heroin trade, human trafficking, gun running and extortion).
111. Farrall, supra note 95, at 133; cf. Byman, supra note 91, at 11 (noting that “common consequence of the embrace of an [Al Qaeda] label is for a group to seek out Western targets within a group’s theater of operations”); Pressman, supra note 94, at 65 (discussing proliferation of Osama bin Laden’s strategy of attacks on Western targets). David
H. Petraeus, the former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, recently told congressional committees that Al Qaeda appears to have influenced the targeting of the American
diplomatic mission in Benghazi, Libya that resulted in the deaths of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans. See Eric Schmitt, Petraeus Says U.S. Tried to
Avoid Tipping Off Terrorists After Libya Attack, NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 17, 2012, at A10.
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sage.”112 Moreover, Al Qaeda insists on specific approval for attacks outside a subsidiary’s regional base.113 For example, when a Danish newspaper
published caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad, Al Qaeda asked its Iraqi
branch to carry out attacks on Danish interests.114 U.S. officials believe that
Hezbollah operatives played a significant role in the July 2012 attack in
Bulgaria on a bus carrying Israeli tourists.115 In addition, Al Qaeda requires
certain operational modalities for attacks outside a branch’s region. Al
Qaeda pushes suicide attacks and patterned attacks on particular kinds of
targets, such as public transportation, government structures and infrastructure.116 This layer of specific operational control demonstrates Al
Qaeda’s organizational contours and confirms its existence and functioning
as a “united front.”117 Al Qaeda also has structural mechanisms that ensure
communication and guidance. It uses information committees that are tied
to senior leadership and operational planners.118
A networked approach driven by an anti-Western strategic focus has
many advantages for Al Qaeda. Shared ideology lessens the likelihood of
deterring the group through ordinary law enforcement or negotiation. Suicide bombers will not blink at the prospect of arrest and trial. Rather, involvement with the legal system confers another opportunity for the attackers to brand themselves as martyrs.119 In addition, networks such as Al
Qaeda and its affiliates are far less amenable to negotiation than territorybased groups. Groups that control territory within a single State may on
occasion be a party to successful negotiations, as the IRA demonstrated. 120
Such movements may gain a stake in negotiations, as they seek to ease State
pressure on their territorial base.121 In contrast, the disaggregation of terri112. Farrall, supra note 95, at 133.
113. Id. at 134.
114. Id.
115. See Nicholas Kulish, Despite U.S. Fear Hezbollah Moves Openly in Europe, NEW
YORK TIMES, Aug. 16, 2012, at A1.
116. See Farrall, supra note 95, at 135.
117. Id. at 133.
118. Id. at 135.
119. Cf. Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NORTHWESTERN
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1, 44–46 (2003) (noting intransigence yielded by ideological
commitments of members of terrorist networks); Michael A. Newton, Exceptional Engagement: Protocol I and a World United Against Terrorism, 45 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 323, 362 (2009) (noting that terrorist groups are often “undeterred by existing criminal law”).
120. See Pressman, supra note 94, at 68–70.
121. Id. at 69.
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tory and operations in transnational networks mean that those groups lack
a “return address.” Since transnational groups can readily shift their operations,122 State pressure is not an effective deterrent. The absence of a general deterrent only exacerbates the risk of armed conflict from transnational
groups, and makes specific deterrence or incapacitation of the group’s operatives all the more imperative.123
On the basis of this analysis of terrorist and network organization, targeting of an Al Qaeda affiliate is permissible on a showing that Al Qaeda
exerts a strategic influence on the targeted group. A State considering targeting members of the Al Qaeda subsidiary should have a reasonable basis
for believing that Al Qaeda guides some or all of the group’s choice of targets. Mere subscription to an ideology is not enough—nor is financing,
although financing can be one factor contributing to an inference of strategic influence. Policymakers should have a reasonable belief that Al Qaeda
has leveraged money, recruits, training or expertise to encourage the affiliate’s targeting of Western interests or moderation in the targeting of Muslim civilians. Ongoing correspondence or exchanges of information about
targeting or operations should give rise to an inference that such influence
is present. Al Qaeda’s role in the training of an affiliate’s recruits should
also have evidentiary significance.124 No rigid hierarchy need be shown—
indeed, as we have seen, the case law from transnational tribunals has often
required less hierarchy than meets the eye.125
IV. CONCLUSION
One need not read the modern jurisprudence defining an OAG as being
limited to groups with headquarters, fully functioning logistics or ironclad
discipline. While the ICTY decisions include language setting out these criteria, the facts of the cases are actually far more ambiguous. In judgments
122. Id. at 70.
123. But see Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones, supra note 88, at 36–37 (noting that network form can create security problems because of looser control by leadership and reliance on local operatives infiltrated by law enforcement, while acknowledging that security
issues have not necessarily impaired groups’ abilities to cause massive harm to civilians).
124. See Haradinaj, supra note 53, ¶ 86 (discussing importance of training).
125. Of course, targeting suspected terrorists is only one aspect of an effective counterterrorism strategy. Aid that reaches needy individuals and groups can help goodwill
toward the West and counter the appeal of terrorist groups. See Aloke Chakravarty, Feeding
Humanity, Starving Terror: The Utility of Aid in a Comprehensive Antiterrorism Financing Strategy,
32 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW 295, 325–29 (2010).
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such as Limaj, the ICTY found organization when traditional elements
were equivocal. The ICTY jurisprudence and the analysis of many commentators point toward a more pragmatic approach.
That said, terrorist organizations often reveal surprisingly strong elements of organization. Like other entities, terrorist groups devise mechanisms to deal with the problem of agency costs. They monitor, assess and
document performance of their personnel, and make appropriate changes
when needed. These measures exist even when they appear to endanger the
groups’ security.
The versatile approach to organization that marks terrorist groups
within a State also holds true for transnational networks such as Al Qaeda.
Al Qaeda operates in a synergistic fashion with regional groups. Many
groups have received training from Al Qaeda’s core feeder sources of
schools and camps, and have sworn allegiance to Al Qaeda to enhance
their appeal and access to resources. Direct operational control is rarely
present. However, strategic influence, including a focus on targeting Western interests, is common. When such strategic influence can be shown, the
definition of an OAG is sufficiently flexible to permit targeting across borders.
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